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In trials against war criminals, the defendants often plead not guilty by rea-
son of insanity in an effort to avoid assuming responsibility for the charged acts. 
The paper discusses the history of the insanity defence and some factors that 
might explain why war crimes are committed. The authors concentrate primarily 
on the psychological elements of insanity and the reasons for extreme violence 
appearing at the individual level. Persons charged with war crimes often use post-
traumatic stress disorder as the basis for an insanity defence. The authors also 
consider insanity from the perspective of international criminal law. By explicitly 
and precisely defining insanity, the Rome Statute moved away from the general 
provisions employed by the Nuremberg Tribunal, while at the same time making 
a clear distinction between insanity and incapacity for trial. Insanity may be 
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i. introduction
According to Power1, the 20th century saw more massacres in military con-
flicts than any previous century. What is more, the 20th century will allegedly 
be remembered as the period of history giving rise to a new form of aggressi-
on – genocide.2 These kinds of claims might not be entirely true, however, as 
acts of extreme violence most likely have existed throughout history, but they 
have remained, compared to modern history standards, poorly or even not at 
all documented in chronicles. Today, genocide is defined as a series of acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group. It can either signify killing the members of these groups or 
causing bodily and mental harm to them.3
Why and how could such destructiveness have developed in the human 
race? As argued by psychologist Ervin Staub4, the primary root of all human 
evil is the frustration of satisfying basic human needs and the development of 
destructive ways for satisfying these needs. Staub identifies extreme destruc-
tiveness as disproportionately (unexpectedly) intense destructiveness consi-
dering the prevailing social conditions prior to its outbreak. The frustration 
of satisfying basic human needs – such as the need for safety, a positive self-
image and autonomy – will give rise to scapegoating, or the practice of blaming 
another group for the causes of dissatisfaction. There are many reasons why 
the frustration of satisfying basic human needs can develop, such as a lack of 
material goods, political turmoil and in-group conflicts, which may all lead 
to extreme violence.5 However, this is merely one hypothesis on the reasons 
leading to extreme violence. A much broader discussion is required to answer 
questions such as: “Why does extreme violence arise?”, “In what circumstan-
ces are those who commit war crimes responsible for their behaviour at the 
time the crime is committed?” and “How should war crimes be considered?” 
The paper seeks to provide some answers as to why war crimes are committed. 
1 Power, S., A problem from hell, America and the age of genocide, Harper Collins Perenni-
al, New York, 2007.
2 Dutton, D. G., Boyanowsky, E. O., Harris Bond, M., Extreme mass homicide: From 
military massacre to genocide, Aggression and Violent Behavior, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2005, 
pp. 10, 437 – 473.
3 Power, S., op. cit. (fn. 1). 
4 Staub, E., The roots of evil: social conditions, culture, personality and basic human needs, 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1999, pp. 179 – 192.
5 Ibid.
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Specifically, we focus on certain individual psychological and legal perspec-
tives of raising the insanity defence in legal proceedings with respect to war 
crimes. In the first part, we discuss the issues of assuming responsibility for 
committed crimes and raising the insanity defence since insanity pleas are 
particularly common among defendants. In the second part of the paper, we 
conclude our deliberations by highlighting some legal aspects of insanity pleas 
in international criminal law.
ii. the inSanity defence
Insanity – or rather madness, as it was called in the past – was a con-
cept known as early as Ancient Greece. It was often understood and explained 
much like physical illnesses, which were thought to be the result of natural 
causes and the imbalance of four basic bodily substances.6 Ancient Romans 
pointed out that strong emotions may lead to physical and mental health pro-
blems. They treated madness as possible grounds for diminished responsibility 
with the mentally ill, but the defendant must first have been found to be ‘not 
of sound mind’ (non compos mentis).7 The Middle Ages saw a turnabout in pro-
gressive understanding of insanity. Until as late as the 13th century, Europe 
seemed to have forgotten that madness or insanity could be grounds for dimi-
nished responsibility. Worse still, an act of malice and the responsibility for 
it were deemed to be inseparable, with the defendant’s mental state bearing 
no importance on the judgment.8 Until around the 17th century, an act of 
malice was considered a punishable offence in Europe only when the accused 
admitted to it.9 For this reason, religious and secular authorities alike did their 
best to obtain, in true Machiavellian fashion, the confessions of the accused. 
The beginning of the Renaissance period spurred the development of a similar 
understanding of responsibility for criminal offences to that prevailing in Anci-
ent Greece and Rome, but no exact criteria for evaluating insanity or madness 
existed until the 18th century. The prevailing opinion of the time was that 
the responsibility for the actions of mentally ill persons could be compared 
6 Weinstein, R. M., Madness, in: G. Ritzer (ed.), The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 
vol. VI, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 2007, pp. 2693 – 2695.
7 Robinson, D. N., An Intellectual History of Psychology, 3rd edition, The University of 
Wisconsin Press, London, 1995.
8 Eigen, J. P., Delisions’s odyssey: charting the course of Victorian forensic psychiatry, Inter-
national Journal of Law and Psychiatry, Vol. 27, No. 5, 2004, pp. 395 – 412. 
9 Foucault, M., Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique, Librarie Plon, Paris, 
1961. 
I. Areh, A. Sotlar, S. Zgaga: Some Psychological and Law Features of the Insanity Defence...90
to wild beasts, and these, of course, could not commit a criminal act because 
they did not have a human soul.10 One of the first trials with preserved docu-
mentation where the defendant was relieved of responsibility for a criminal act 
on the grounds of mental confusion or madness was held in the UK.11 About 
two hundred years later, in the 18th century, the concept of minimal mental 
competency for defendants began to emerge and soon became the benchmark 
of a just and fair trial.12 It was also during this era that changes to English 
and French legislation were introduced, encouraging greater tolerance towards 
and acceptance of defendants with mental or personality disorders.13 The first 
sanity tests were introduced soon afterwards and were conducted by non-legal 
experts.14 In current legal practice, insanity as a legal defence implies the disc-
harge of responsibility for a committed crime. This can either be because a cri-
me was committed by a person suffering from a mental disorder, limiting their 
capacity for sound judgment, or as a result of other excusable reasons, such as 
the inability to distinguish between right and wrong.15 Generally speaking, the 
insanity defence can only be raised for the period of time in which a criminal 
act was committed. This means that an assessment of whether the mental 
condition of the accused was significantly impaired or disturbed at the time 
the crime was committed has to be obtained retrospectively. Importantly, it 
should be remembered that there are two basic ways of defining insanity: as a 
legal concept or a psychological concept, with the latter treating it as a mental 
or personality disorder. A person can be diagnosed as mentally ill, but can still 
be held responsible for a committed criminal act if they were able to control 
their behaviour and distinguish between what is morally right and wrong.16
iii. the inSanity defence in war crime caSeS
What are the most common reasons behind insanity pleas in war crime 
cases? If the prosecution presents solid evidence on committed war crimes, 
10 Roesch, R., Ogloff, J. R. P., Golding, S. L., Competence to stand trial: legal and clinical 
issues, Applied and Preventative Psychology, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1993, pp. 45 – 51.
11 Eigen, J. P., op. cit. (fn. 8). 
12 Roesch, R., Ogloff, J. R. P., Golding, S. L., op. cit. (fn. 10). 
13 Scull, A. T., Madhouses, Mad-doctors, and Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in 
the Victorian Era, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1981.
14 Howitt, D., Introduction to forensic and criminal psychology, Pearson Education, Har-
low, 2009. 
15 Davison, G. C., Neale, J. M., Abnormal Psychology, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 
2001.
16 Ibid.
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defendants often plead not guilty by reason of insanity or severely impaired 
judgment. A frequent diagnosis used in proceedings to corroborate impaired 
judgment is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The first attempts of de-
fining PTSD date back to the 17th century, when it was described as a sort 
of nostalgia manifesting itself as behavioural and mental issues in soldiers.17 
During World War I (1914-1918), a period which saw a swift rise in the de-
velopment and use of new weapons of mass destruction and modes of combat, 
the term shell shock gained ground. Described as a form of war psychosis, it 
was said to result from concussions suffered during grenade explosions. Using 
combat trauma as an argument to reduce the sentence of offenders first appea-
red in criminal law and civil law following World War I. One of the first recor-
ded insanity pleads for military veterans dates back to 1925, when the accused 
tried to avoid a child abuse sentence by attributing his behaviour to grenade 
shock suffered during the war.18 During the Vietnam War (1965-1973) and 
in the years that followed, American veterans appearing in court increasingly 
suffered from combat trauma and used this as defence in court proceedings, 
creating the need for a formal definition of PTSD. This finally happened in 
1980 with the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men-
tal Disorders (DSM-III), published by the American Psychiatric Association. 
From the 1980s onwards, the number of cases in civil, criminal and military 
jurisprudence where the defendants included PTSD in their defence grew ra-
pidly. However, it was later proven by experts that such defences were often 
unfounded.19 Modern warfare, as exemplified by the Iraq War (2003-2011) 
and the Afghanistan War (2003-), has brought new ways of fighting as a re-
sult of new technology, yet approximately 20% of soldiers continue to suffer 
from PTSD.20 Previously, Baumeister and Campbell21 found that up to 30% 
17 Miller, L., Posttraumatic stress disorder and criminal violence: Basic concepts and clinical-




20 Holbrook, J., Veterans’ courts and criminal responsibility: A problem-solving history and 
approach to the liminality of combat trauma, in: D. C. Kelly, S. Howe-Barksdale, D. Gi-
telson (eds.), Treating young veterans: Promoting resilience through practice and advocacy, 
Springer, New York, 2011, pp. 259 – 300. 
21 Baumeister, R. F., Campbell, W. K., The intrinsic appeal of evil: Sadism, sensational 
thrills, and threatened egotism, Personality and Social Psychology Review, Vol. 3, No. 
3, 1999, pp. 210 – 221.
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of soldiers suffered from PTSD and that the condition was mainly caused by 
their own violent behaviour. Since PTSD accompanies all military conflicts, 
members of the armed forces continue to use it in an attempt to mitigate their 
sentence.22 Symptoms of PTSD include, among soldiers and veterans alike, 
episodes of irritability, impulsivity and insomnia. In order to alleviate these 
symptoms, sufferers turn to substance abuse (most often alcohol abuse), only 
to aggravate their condition. The risk of committing war crimes increases when 
members of the armed forces display symptoms such as:23
• impulsivity (the tendency to react in a reckless, uncontrolled manner 
accompanied by low frustration tolerance),
• predominantly negative emotional states (e.g. anxiety, depression, sus-
picion, anger and hostility, all leading to excessive responses to mild 
provocation),
• antisocial behaviour (perpetrators would frequently see themselves as 
noble warriors in a hostile environment who are entitled to privileges 
such as money, status and women due to their role),
• psychoactive substance abuse (lowering the inhibition of antisocial be-
haviour).
It is only reasonable to expect that the described emotional responses, be-
havioural patterns and perception of reality increase the probability of outbur-
sts of extreme violence. However, it must be stressed that PTSD assessment 
of persons allegedly suffering from this disorder is by no means easy, as most 
symptoms can easily be feigned.24
At the individual level, causes for extreme violence can be traced not only 
to PTSD. For example, Fromm described sadism as the conversion of impo-
tence into the experience of omnipotence, placing at its core the desire for 
complete and unrestricted control over another person.25 Control is manife-
sted by inflicting pain and humiliation on others, with the victim being unable 
to defend him or herself. According to Fromm, the sense of omnipotence is 
22 Miller, L., op. cit. (fn. 17). 
23 Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., Rehabilitating criminal justice policy and practice, Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2010, pp. 39 – 55.
24 Sweet, J. J., Posttraumatic stress disorder and neuropsychological malingering: A complicated 
scenario, in: J. E. Morgan, J. J. Sweet (eds.), Neuropsychology of malingering casebook, 
Psychology Press, New York, 2009, pp. 155 – 169. 
25 Fromm, E., The anatomy of human destructiveness, Holt Paperbacks, New York, 
1973/1992.
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created by the ability to create the illusion of transcending the restrictions of 
human existence, particularly in those frustrated by their own inefficiency and 
those unhappy with their lives. With this interpretation of extreme violence, 
it is hard to avoid drawing parallels with the previously mentioned emotional 
responses of persons suffering from PTSD, particularly when we consider that 
at the core of both states lies an intense sense of anxiety at being trapped by 
the limits of one’s own existence. Other psychodynamic authors such as Freud 
argued that deviant leaders who find themselves in the role of those creating 
extreme violence are able to emotionally detach themselves completely from 
everyone except themselves, being able to commit crimes without experiencing 
guilt and inducing similar behaviour in their followers.26
Interestingly, there appear to be a number of similarities between war cri-
minals and serial killers or serial sexual abusers. A high percentage of war 
criminals were victims of child sexual abuse, as with serial killers and sexu-
al abusers.27 Further, they all share predominantly stereotypical convictions 
about their victims. Serial rapists might often view women as whores and seek 
their victims among prostitutes.28 Strong similarities have also been establis-
hed between civilian and military war crimes when considering them from the 
perspective of the FBI’s crime scene analysis. Here, serial offenders are divided 
into two theoretical groups: organized and disorganized offenders. Organized 
offenders are psychopathic personalities devoid of empathy, while disorgani-
zed offenders are psychotic personalities who might position the bodies to suit 
their preferences or insert objects into the victim’s vagina. This distinction has 
also been established by war crime investigators.29 However, caution is needed 
when war criminals are compared with serial offenders, as the circumstances 
are not the same in these criminal offences. Serial offenders with a sadistic or 
antisocial personality disorder commit crimes independently, while war crimi-
nals often follow orders and transfer the blame for their actions to their supe-
riors. Moreover, war crimes are frequently committed by persons who display 
no signs of psychosis prior to the armed conflict; on the contrary, they might 
26 Freud, S., Group psychology and the analysis of the ego, International Psychoanalytic 
Press, London, 1922. 
27 Ressler, R. K., Burgess, A. W., Douglas, J. E., Hartman, C. R., D’Agostino, R. B., 
Sexual killers and their victims: Identifying patterns through crime scene analysis, Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1986, pp. 288 – 308.
28 Marshall, W. L., Kennedy, P., Sexual sadism in sexual offenders: An elusive diagnosis, 
Aggression and Violent Behaviour, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003, pp. 1 – 22.
29 Dutton, D. G., Boyanowsky, E. O., Harris-Bond, M., op. cit. (fn. 2). 
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typically be disciplined and normal persons, both privately and in the armed 
forces, returning to their initial normality once the conflict has been resolved.30
We will now look at social psychology, where examples of deviant beha-
viour are explained by how social context influences human behaviour. One 
of the most renowned researchers of human aggression and violence, Philip 
Zimbardo, describes deindividuated aggression where arousal and anomie 
merge into aggressive behaviour, bringing the aggressor pleasure with a self-
reinforcing effect. Without restrictions, violence is quick to escalate both in 
intensity and frequency. With the suppression of the common violence inhi-
bitors, aggressive behaviour experience turns into gratification.31 In military 
combat, the disappearance of normative aggression inhibitors is quite evident, 
but a lack of such inhibitors is not all that generates violence. In fact, armed 
conflicts themselves spontaneously motivate the emergence and development 
of new social norms that justify and even encourage violence.32 Several previo-
us psychological studies have shown that atrocious crimes can be committed 
by persons otherwise perceived as normal. Famously, the populist Milgram 
experiment on obedience – today deemed a methodological disaster – is one 
such example. Nevertheless, the latest research evidence has confirmed some 
of Milgram’s hypotheses and it seems that, for many war criminals, predispo-
sing factors for developing aggression later on cannot be determined.33 As has 
already been mentioned, the importance of environment was emphasized by 
Zimbardo and his Stanford prison experiment, which revealed that, in some 
people, contagious situations induce extreme deviance. In this experiment in 
a mock prison, a third of the guards became verbally abusive and employed 
physical punishment against the prisoners, although both groups were univer-
sity peers just a few days earlier.34 It seems that the reasons behind war crimes 
lie in the fact that people find themselves in unusual, extreme circumstances 
30 Lifton, R. J., Home from the war – neither victims nor executioners, Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1973.
31 Zimbardo, P. G., The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order versus deindividuati-
on, impulse, and chaos, in: W. Arnold, B. D. Levine (eds.), Nebraska symposium on 
Motivation, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1969, pp. 237 – 307. 
32 Dutton, D. G., Boyanowsky, E. O., Harris Bond, M., op. cit. (fn. 2). 
33 Waller, J., Becoming evil: How ordinary people commit genocide and mass killing, 2nd edi-
tion, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007. 
34 Haney, C., Banks, W. C., Zimbardo, P. G., Interpersonal dynamics in a simulated pri-
son, International Journal of Criminology and Penology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1973, pp. 
69 – 97.
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (1) 87-103 (2016) 95
and are given the opportunity to establish a master-slave relationship.35 Appa-
rently, some people can resist the temptation of taking advantage of anomic 
conditions, so how much do personality differences between those involved in 
armed conflict really contribute towards war crimes? Toch36 has found that, 
among violent males, an estimated 6% took pleasure in hurting others. Analo-
gously, Groth37 revealed that 5% of rapists enjoyed inflicting pain on their vic-
tims. Moreover, a normal population has an estimated 1.2% of psychopathic 
personality cases38, which is less than was demonstrated by Toch and Groth, 
but nevertheless clearly shows that a certain percentage of the male population 
has personality risk factors for the outbreak of extreme violence episodes such 
as war crimes. Still, war conditions differ greatly from non-conflict conditions 
in which violent sexual offences are committed. In war conditions, we can 
expect to see a rise in the number of persons capable of committing extreme 
acts of violence, probably due to a reduced sense of responsibility and guilt.39 
It seems that we are no closer to answering the question of what triggers such 
extreme acts of violence such as war crimes at the individual level. Personality 
analyses of Nazi leaders and officers charged with crimes against humanity at 
the Nuremberg trials following World War II revealed that, for example, there 
were no personality predictors helping to indicate behaviour in relation with 
the Holocaust and other war crimes.40 It seems that the way we experience and 
interpret unusual conditions influences our behaviour to such a degree that it 
might elicit unexpected reactions. Yet this does not mean that all people react 
unexpectedly in war conditions and that the system of morals and values is 
bound to collapse. Not all those who engage in warfare are war criminals; on 
the contrary, most military staff never commit a war crime. This was a brief 
discussion on insanity and war crimes from the psychological perspective. We 
35 Ibid.
36 Toch, H., Violent men: An inquiry into the psychology of violence, American Psychological 
Association, Washington, 1969/1993. 
37 Groth, A. N., Men who rape: The psychology of the offender, Basic Books, New York, 
1979. 
38 Neumann, C. S., Hare, R. D., Psychopathic traits in a large community sample: Links to 
violence, alcohol use, and intelligence, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
Vol. 76, No. 5, 2008, pp. 893 – 899.
39 Dutton, D. G., Boyanowsky, E. O., Harris-Bond, M., op. cit. (fn. 2). 
40 Suedfeld, P., Reverberations of the Holocaust fifty years later: Psychology’s contributions to 
understanding persecution and genocide, Canadian Psychology, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2000, 
pp. 1 – 9. 
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will now turn to the legal perspective, which, quite often, has to resolve diffe-
rent issues.
iV. inSanity in international criminal law
From the criminal law perspective, insanity is a state of mental malfunctio-
ning in an offender who commits an act with all signs of a crime, sufficient to 
relieve them of legal responsibility for the act committed. Despite the many 
definitions of insanity in criminal jurisdictions in different countries, most in-
sanity definitions in criminal law are centred on two causally related elements: 
the biological element and the psychological element.41 Typically, the biologi-
cal element is defined as a mental abnormality, and the psychological element 
as either the inability of a person to understand the wrongfulness of their act 
or as the inability to control their conduct. Here, insanity is interpreted accor-
ding to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statu-
te), the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) 
and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY).
In international criminal law, insanity is considered as a complete defence 
for persons found to be insane. While civil law systems distinguish between 
justifications and excuses, common law systems focus on defences. The Rome 
Statute, which serves as the basis for the decisions of the first permanent In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), introduced the first ever comprehensive 
codification of justifications and excuses. Adopted in 1998 in Rome, the Sta-
tute entered into force after achieving 60 ratifications in 2002 and currently 
has over 120 signatories. In Article 31, the Rome Statute provides grounds 
for excluding criminal responsibility, one of them being insanity.42 In previous 
statutes, the issue of insanity was not specifically addressed; for example, the 
Nuremberg Charter does not even mention it. This was a document that en-
tered into force with the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945, 
serving as the basis for trial and punishment of Nazi leaders who committed 
war crimes during World War II. The Nuremberg Charter was followed by the 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
41 Schönke, A., Schröder, H., Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar, C.H. Beck, München, 2010. 
42 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. 
Retrieved from http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.
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from 1993 which already contains a general legal basis for insanity pleas.43 
This is clearly evident from the UN Secretary-General’s report which states 
that the ICTY itself decides on the use of justifications and excuses defences, 
thereby possibly relieving a person of individual criminal responsibility. Such 
defences could be minimum age or mental incapacity, according to the general 
principles recognized by all nations.44 Further, insanity is mentioned in the 
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence in connection with a possible medical, 
psychological or psychiatric check-up of the defendant45 and in connection 
with the defendant’s obligation to give notice of any special defence they are 
raising, including that of diminished mental responsibility or lack thereof.46
V. inSanity and incapacity for trial
From the legal perspective, both insanity and incapacity for trial suggest 
the existence of mental abnormality causing the offender to lack conscious 
awareness of the act committed and/or the inability to control their conduct. 
Insanity is relevant at the moment the crime was committed and allows a com-
plete defence, while incapacity for trial becomes relevant later, at the time the 
defendant is being tried in a court of law. If a defendant is found incompetent 
to stand trial, the proceedings are suspended or terminated while the offence 
charged remains valid.
In the Nuremberg trials against Nazi war criminals, pleading insanity at 
the time the offence was committed and pleading incapacity for trial were, as 
a rule, employed simultaneously.47 In fact, defendants often used the insanity 
43 Knoops, G. J., Defences in Contemporary International Criminal Law, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2008; Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General pursuant 
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993). Retrieved from http://www.
icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf; Sparr, L. F., 
Personality Disorders and Criminal Law: An International Perspective, Journal of Ameri-
can Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, Vol. 37, 2009, pp. 168 – 181. 
44 Secretary General, op. cit. (fn. 43).
45 Krug, P., The Emerging Mental Incapacity Defense in International Criminal Law: Some 
Initial Questions of Implementation, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 94, 
No. 2, 2000, pp. 317 – 335. 
46 International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, Rules on procedure and evidence, 1993. 
Retrieved from http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evi-
dence/IT032_rev44_en.pdf.
47 Weiner, P. L., Fitness Hearings in War Crimes Cases: From Nuremberg to The Hague, 
Boston college international and comparative law review, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2007, pp. 
185 – 198.
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defence in an attempt to have the proceedings against them terminated due to 
their incompetency to stand trial.48 The legal practice of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal reveals that the judges mainly focused on the defendants’ competence to 
stand trial.49 However, the judgements of the Nuremberg Tribunal and other 
military tribunals established in the aftermath of World War II reveal some 
perspectives and examples on how the issue of insanity was approached. For 
example, the Streicher50 trial raised the issue of the defendant’s intelligence. 
Prior to the trial, Streicher scored 106 on an IQ test, the lowest score of all 
the defendants but still high enough that he should have been aware of the 
wrongfulness of his actions.51 Therefore, the insanity defence was unsuccessful 
and the defendant was subsequently found guilty and executed.
In the Milch52 case, the defence claimed that the reason for the crimes com-
mitted was in the defendant’s violent temper and the fact that he was overwor-
ked and, therefore, was not wholly responsible for all his utterances.53 More-
over, the defence argued that the accused gave orders in fits of uncontrolled 
anger and was not expecting his associates and subordinates to actually carry 
them out. Allegedly, the fits of uncontrollable anger were the result of head 
injuries that the accused had suffered in two serious accidents.54 The Tribunal 
found the defendant guilty on this count. The judge expressed his opinion 
that the offences were made persistently, over a long period of time. Had the 
defendant made only a few violent statements and orders, the explanation 
48 Chesnut, P. F., Certificate of service on defendant Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen, 1945. Re-
trieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-07.asp; International Military Tribu-
nal (Nuremberg), Judgment of 1 October 1946, 1946. Retrieved from http://crimeo-
faggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf.
49 Lawrence, G., Order of the Tribunal Rejecting the Motion on Behalf of Defendant Hess, and 
Designating a Commission to Examine Defendant Hess with Reference to his Mental Com-
petence and Capacity to Stand Trial, 1945. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
imt/v1-27.asp.
50 Julius Streicher was an important element of the Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda 
machine. 
51 The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Crimi-
nals: the Trial of Peter Back, 1948. Retrieved from http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-3.pdf.
52 Erhard Milch was one of the key figures in the development of the Nazi aerial war-
fare. 
53 Appleman, J. A., Military Tribunals and International Crimes, Bobs-Merrill Company 
Inc. Publishers, Indianapolis, 1954.
54 Ibid.
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offered by the defence might have had some bearing. Nevertheless, since the 
statements were made over a long period of time, at various places and un-
der varying conditions, the Tribunal concluded that they reflected the true 
defendant’s attitude toward the Nazi foreign labour policy and its victims.55 In 
passing a sentence, the insanity plea was therefore not accepted.56
In contrast, the Krupp57 case was a typical example of using the incapacity 
for trial defence. At the time of the trial, the defendant was 75 years old, had 
health issues, was unable to communicate and had completely lost the ability 
to understand what was going on around him.58 The defence called experts 
who testified that the defendant was unfit to stand trial. To this, the prosecu-
tion pleaded that the defendant be tried in absentia or that the defendant be 
substituted with his son, Alfried.59 The tribunal granted the defence motion, 
terminated the proceedings against Gustav Krupp and dismissed the substitu-
tion of Alfried for Gustav Krupp.60 
Also of interest is the Hess case. Here, the defendant claimed that he was 
unfit to stand trial, therefore the tribunal appointed a panel of experts to de-
termine whether Rudolf Hess was, in fact, competent to stand trial.61 Their 
assessment spanned the defendant’s entire life during World War II, inclu-
ding the period when he was detained in England and had supposedly began 
to suffer from amnesia.62 The experts could not agree on whether Hess was 
simulating loss of memory, but their prevailing opinion was that he showed 
dissociative disorder symptoms, psychopathy symptoms and had suffered par-
55 The United Nations War Crimes Commission, op. cit. (fn. 51). 
56 Scaliotti, M., Defences before the International Criminal Law, Substantive Grounds for 
Excluding Criminal Responsibility, Part 2, International Criminal Law Review, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, 2002, pp. 1 – 46.
57 Gustav Krupp was an influential German industrialist charged with committing 
crimes against humanity for mistreating concentration camp inmates as forced la-
bour. 
58 Chesnut, op. cit. (fn. 48); Tunbridge, R. E., Piedelievre, R., Kurshakov, N., Sepp, E., 
Krasnushkin, E., Report of Medical Commission Appointed to Examine Defendant Gustav 
Krupp Von Bohlen, 1945. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-10.asp.
59 Jackson, R. H., Answer of the United States prosecution to the motion on behalf of defendant 
Gustav Krupp Von Bohlen, 1945. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-
11.asp.
60 Weiner, P. L., op. cit. (fn. 47).
61 Lawrence, G., op. cit. (fn. 49).
62 International Military Tribunal, op. cit. (fn. 48); Weiner, P. L., op. cit. (fn. 47).
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tial amnesia, but was still competent to stand trial.63 The tribunal found that 
the defendant indeed acted abnormally, suffered from loss of memory and 
had mentally deteriorated during the trial, but none of this meant that he did 
not realize the nature of the charges against him or that he was incapable of 
defending himself. Moreover, the tribunal concluded that there were no facts 
substantiating the claim that the defendant was not sane when the acts he was 
charged with were committed.64 
Unlike the Nuremberg Charter, the ICTY Statute and legal practice and 
the Rome Statute are more consistent in defining mental abnormality at the 
time a crime was committed. In these statutes, the biological condition serving 
as the basis for the insanity plea is defined in more detail. While the Nurem-
berg Tribunal at first defined the biological condition in a general manner 
as insanity influencing the defendant’s behaviour in a certain way65, it later 
(1948) made the definition more specific, for example in the Gerbsch66 case. 
From then on, the biological condition of insanity signified that the mental 
faculties in the accused were defective and undeveloped.67 As has previously 
been mentioned, Item A in the first paragraph of Article 31 of the Rome Sta-
tute provides that a person is not criminally responsible if they suffer from a 
mental disease or defect at the time the criminal act was committed, thereby 
rendering them incapable of appreciating the unlawfulness or nature of their 
conduct, or if they are incapable of controlling their conduct to conform to 
the requirements of law. This is, therefore, a more comprehensive definition of 
the biological condition of insanity, specified in the Rome Statute as mental 
disease or defect at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, the Rome 
Statute adds the psychological condition for the insanity defence, identifying 
its two components:68
63 Rees, J., British Medical Report in Hess case, 1945. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/imt/chap_04.asp.
64 International Military Tribunal, op. cit. (fn. 48). 
65 Weiner, P. L., op. cit. (fn. 47).
66 In 1948, Wilhelm Gerbsch was found guilty by the Court in Amsterdam of commit-
ting ill treatment against Dutch prisoners in the German penal camp Zoeschen 
where he was a guard.  
67 Scaliotti, M., op. cit. (fn. 56); The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals: the Trial of Erhard Milch, 1949. Retrieved from 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-7.pdf.
68 Bassiouni, C., The legislative history of the ICC: An article by article evolution of the statu-
te, Trasnational Publishers, New York, 2005.
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• awareness: the defendant is incapable of appreciating the unlawfulness 
or nature of their conduct;
• volition: the defendant does not have the capacity to control their con-
duct to conform to the requirements of law.
The offender’s ability to appreciate or control his or her conduct must be 
completely absent or destroyed.69 In addition, according to the Rome Statute, 
a causality must exist between the biological and the psychological elements. 
The ICTY formulated the biological condition through its legal practice, in two 
general designations. In the Čelebići case, the biological condition was defined 
as a defect of reason or disease of the mind.70 At the same time, the ICTY 
used the insanity definition from the Rome Statute, relating it primarily to the 
psychological element or condition awareness.71 
Vi. concluSion
It seems that the Rome Statute, unlike some previous statutes, succeeds in 
formulating provisions which can be used by the ICC in practice and are po-
tentially effective. Previously, international criminal courts had a general legal 
basis for applying the insanity defence or they employed it in legal practice 
for specific cases. The Rome Statute explicitly regulates the issue of insanity, 
making a clear distinction between insanity and incapacity for trial. In this, it 
differs essentially from the Nuremberg Charter and the Nuremberg Tribunal 
legal practice, coming close to and even upgrading the ICTY Statute. By expli-
citly defining insanity elements, it corresponds with the legal practice of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICTY in content, but it is formally more clearly 
delineated from its predecessors in that it does not leave these issues up to 
the legal practice of international courts, but rather defines insanity elements 
along the known biological-psychological paradigm. As far as the effects of 
insanity are concerned, the Rome Statute provisions do not essentially differ 
from similar statutes and legal practice of international criminal law. Insanity 
69 Knoops, G. J., op. cit. (fn. 43). 
70 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia Since 1991, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić, Hazim Delić, 
Esad Landžo, IT-96-21-Abis, judgment on sentence appeal, 2003. Retrieved from www.
icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf.
71 Knoops, G. J., op. cit. (fn. 43).
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is therefore considered a complete defence resulting in exclusion of the crimi-
nal act and, more specifically, exclusion of the offender’s culpability. 
In its regulation of the insanity issue, the Rome Statute is a compromise 
between the common law and the civil law systems, making it unproblematic 
from the legal perspective. However, there is a need for standardizing psycho-
logical diagnostics serving as the basis for establishing the biological condition 
of insanity, as this would facilitate work at the international level and ensure 
the principle of equality. Unfortunately, a complete unification of diagnostics 
is not possible due to different existing diagnostic criteria, such as Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM – IV) and International 
Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD – 11), 
which fail to conform sufficiently in order to satisfy lawyers. A further problem 
is posed by the fact that defendants often fake the symptoms of insanity in an 
attempt to avoid punishment, and there is also the difficulty of establishing 
the defendant’s mental health retrospectively. Sometimes the offence charged 
was committed several years prior to the court proceedings, making it easier to 
manipulate the truth.





neKe pSiholoŠKe i praVne KaraKteriStiKe 
KORIŠTENJA NEUBROJIVOSTI U OBRANI NA SUĀENJIMA 
Za ratne ZloČine u europi
Na suđenjima ratnim zločincima optuženici su se često izjašnjavali da nisu krivi 
zbog neubrojivosti u nastojanju da izbjegnu preuzimanje odgovornosti za kaznena 
djela za koja su optuženi. Rad razmatra povijest korištenja neubrojivosti za obranu 
i neke čimbenike koji bi mogli objasniti zašto su neki ratni zločini počinjeni. Autori se 
usredotočuju prvenstveno na psihološke elemente neubrojivosti i razloge za ekstremno 
nasilje, koje se pojavljuje na individualnoj razini. Osobe koje se terete za ratne zločine 
često koriste posttraumatski stresni poremećaj kao osnovu za korištenje neubrojivosti u 
obrani. Autori također razmatraju neubrojivost iz perspektive međunarodnog kaznenog 
prava. Rimski statut se sa izričitim i preciznim definiranjem neubrojivosti odmaknuo od 
općih odredaba, upotrjebljenih na Nürnberškom sudu, u isto vrijeme čineći jasnu razliku 
između neubrojivosti i nesposobnosti za suđenje. Neubrojivost može činiti cjelovitu 
obranu, koja rezultira isključenjem kaznenog djela i isključenjem krivnje počinitelja.
Ključne riječi: ratni zločin, neubrojivost, međunarodno kazneno pravo
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